This paper considers a pure-endowment stationary stochastic overlapping generations economy, in which agents have maxmin expected utility preferences. Two main results are obtained. First, we show that multiple stationary monetary equilibria exist. Consequently, real and price indeterminacies arise under the assumption that aggregate shock exists. Second, we show that each of these stationary monetary equilibria is conditionally Pareto optimal; i.e., no other stationary allocations strictly Pareto dominate the equilibrium allocations.
Since Savage's (1954) pioneering work, most studies on economics under uncertainty have considered agents who choose their actions to maximize the expected utility with a unique prior. Ellsberg's (1961) example, however, highlighted a plausible situation where agents may not have a belief about the uncertain situation that is summarized by a single prior because they have only too imprecise information. Methods for explaining Ellsberg's example of decision making under imprecise information did not appear until 20 years later, in the seminal papers by Schmeidler (1982, 1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . They axiomatized the maxmin expected utility (MEU) preference, under which agents attempt to maximize the expected utility minimized over a set of priors, not a unique prior. 1 Although the class of preferences with multiple priors includes the class of expected utility preferences with a unique prior as a special case, the situation where an agent's belief is summarized by a set of priors (and not by a unique prior) is now called ambiguity. 2 This remarkable advance in decision theory has been welcomed in a broad range of disciplines including economics, game theory and finance. 3 In the last two decades, implications of ambiguity have been explored in several general equilibrium settings. As shown by Dow and Werlang (1992) , Tallon (1998) , Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon (2000) and Dana (2004) , one of the most important findings in the existing literature is that indeterminacy of equilibria can be generated in the static Arrow-Debreu economy under ambiguity when there is no aggregate uncertainty. 4 Here, no aggregate uncertainty means that the total endowment does not change over the state space. 5 However, Rigotti and Shannon (2012) argued that such indeterminacy is not robust in the canonical Arrow-Debreu economy; i.e., the equilibrium is generically determinate. Roughly speaking, this means that indeterminacy would disappear if the economy was "shaken" only a little bit. In fact, the set of Arrow-Debreu economies with no aggregate uncertainty has zero Lebesgue measure. This suggests the importance of examining what kind of mechanisms can generate robust equilibrium indeterminacy under ambiguity by embedding it into the general equilibrium framework. The main subject of this paper is to present such a mechanism by embedding ambiguity into a stochastic overlapping generations (OLG) economy.
The OLG model is an intertemporal general equilibrium model that has a demographic structure with overlapping generations. Although the OLG model can be considered at various levels of generality, this paper emphasizes the role of ambiguity by considering a simple but rather canonical stationary pure-endowment stochastic OLG model. Time is divided into discrete dates and runs from 1 to infinity. At each date, one of the finite states is realized. A history of states is called a "date-event." At each date-event, a single perishable commodity is available and a new agent that lives for two consecutive dates is born. Each agent has the opportunity to trade a single infinitely-lived outside asset (money), which has a constant supply and yields no dividend. There exists neither storage technology nor production. Therefore, the ingredients of our model are almost the same as those found in a canonical stochastic OLG model. A remarkable departure of this paper from the standard stochastic OLG model is that each agent is endowed with the MEU preference. This paper will make four main achievements. Firstly, we show that a stationary monetary equilibrium is characterized by a system of inclusions, not by that of equations. As the second and central achievement, we show the robust indeterminacy of the stationary monetary equilibrium, which is a time-invariant equilibrium with circulating money. To make the meaning of robustness clear, let us call a pair of initial endowments in the first and second periods of the agent's life an economy. Then the second result is that there is a nonempty open set of economies, each element of which generates a continuum of stationary monetary equilibria. libria in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with an infinitely-lived representative agent. Note, however, that they only demonstrated nominal indeterminacy in this setting; i.e., they demonstrated the indeterminacy of the equilibrium asset prices but not of the equilibrium allocation. In their model, the single representative agent consumes the sum of the initial endowment and the dividend at each date along the equilibrium price path, and hence, real indeterminacy does not occur by the definition of the equilibrium.
Furthermore, we argue that such economies exhibit aggregate uncertainty. Thirdly, we conduct comparative statics of the ambiguity. We show that an increase in ambiguity (in the sense that the set of priors dilates) increases the sizes of both the range of the stationary monetary equilibria and the set of economies generating a continuum of stationary monetary equilibria. Finally, we show that each of these stationary monetary equilibria is conditionally Pareto optimal. In other words, the equilibria are not Pareto comparable with each other.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some relevant results from the existing literature. Section 3 describes the details of our model. Section 4 provides two-state examples that illustrate the mechanism generating indeterminacy of equilibria. Section 5 demonstrates that stationary monetary equilibrium can be characterized by a system of inclusions and then shows the existence and robust indeterminacy of stationary monetary equilibria. Section 6 conducts comparative statics that illustrates the effect of greater ambiguity on the equilibrium outcomes. Section 7 examines the optimality of stationary monetary equilibria. Proofs are collected in the final section.
Related Literature
This paper builds on a number of contributions. As mentioned in the Introduction, the static Arrow-Debreu model under ambiguity can generate indeterminacy of equilibria (for example, when there exists no aggregate uncertainty). However, such indeterminacy is not robust. To generate robust indeterminacy in a general equilibrium setting under ambiguity, "some other ingredient has to be inserted" as proposed by Mukerji and Tallon (2004, P.285) . The most recent studies found some situations that exhibit robust indeterminacy in a general equilibrium setting under ambiguity. Mukerji and Tallon (2001, Theorem) incorporated an idiosyncratic component of the asset returns into the Arrow-Debreu model to argue the incompleteness of financial markets and indeterminacy of equilibria. 6 Furthermore, Mandler (2013, Proposition 1) 6 See Rinaldi (2009) for additional information. Note, however, that since the MEU preference is a special case of the variational preference axiomatized by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustihici (2006) and since any variational preference may be approximated arbitrarily well by another smooth variational preference, Rinaldi's (2009) result is not a confirmation that Mukerji and Tallon's (2001) result works for the whole class of variational preferences. In a similar fashion, the robust indeterminacy in this paper is concerned with the robustness with respect to only the initial endowments and not the robustness with respect to both the initial endowments and the preferences. That is, the preferences are supposed to be fixed. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point clear.
recently developed a near Arrow-Debreu model by introducing a productive asset and sequential trades. He found robust indeterminacy of equilibria. In his model, the production was used to drive the economy to a point where agents face decision-making in a setting in which there exist no aggregate uncertainty. The observation made in this paper contributes to this line of the literature by providing a new mechanism which generates robust indeterminacy of equilibria in a general equilibrium model under ambiguity. That is, we use the intuition obtained from the static Arrow-Debreu model and embed ambiguity into a stochastic OLG model with money.
We can adjust the value of money in each state to make the environment similar to the one with no aggregate uncertainty. One may consider that this mechanism is, in some sense, similar to Mandler's (2013) . However, they are quite distinct from each other because, in our model, the flexible adjustment of the real price of money (not the production) makes the environment with which the agents is faced similar to the static one. In a summary, we could say that, by introducing a demographic structure with overlapping generations and an infinitely-lived asset (money) in a constant supply to an intertemporal general equilibrium setting, we can generate robust indeterminacy of equilibria under ambiguity.
Our observations also contribute to studies on stochastic OLG models of the general equilibrium. The proposed model is simple but rather canonical and similar to those considered in the literature. For examples, see Magill and Quinzii (2003) , Labadie (2004) and Ohtaki (2011) .
However, the central subjects of these preceding works are different from ours. 7 We should note that this paper is the first that introduces the MEU preferences to the stochastic OLG model with money. 8
Our model is canonical except for the preferences, but the density of the stationary monetary equilibria is quite different from the preceding studies. In representative agent models, Manuelli (1990, Proposition 1) , Magill and Quinzii (2003, Proposition 1) and Ohtaki (2011, Proposition 1 ′ ) reported several sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of stationary monetary equilibrium. 9 Furthermore, Gottardi (1996, Theorem 1) showed that a stationary monetary equi-7 Labadie (2004) explored financial arrangements that could realize the optimal allocations. Magill and Quinzii (2003) examined the asymptotic properties of monetary equilibrium processes. 8 Fukuda (2008) introduced firms with convex Choquet expected utility preferences to Diamond's (1965) OLG model with a capital accumulation.
9 Interested readers may also see Ohtaki (2013b) .
librium generically exists and is locally isolated in a more complicated stochastic OLG model with many one-period securities and many agents endowed with smooth preferences. With the MEU preferences which is known to be nonsmooth, in contrast, we show that the indeterminacy of stationary monetary equilibria can arise even when the sufficient conditions provided in the preceding works for the uniqueness of stationary monetary equilibrium are satisfied.
Finally, we mention our observation on the optimality of equilibria. Optimality of equilibrium allocations has been characterized by Manuelli (1990) , Aiyagari and Peled (1991) , Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) , Demang and Laroque (1999) and Ohtaki (2013a) among others.
These studies presumed that the preferences were smooth. However, the MEU preferences are nonsmooth as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Therefore, we cannot directly apply the characterization results developed in these preceding studies to the current model. 10 Instead of applying the established characterization results, we have more directly demonstrated the optimality of stationary monetary equilibria by tailoring Sakai's (1988) proof to our model.
The Model
We consider a stationary, pure-endowment, stochastic overlapping generations economy with money, where agents' beliefs about uncertain situations are represented by multiple priors, not by a single prior. 11
Stochastic Environment
Time is discrete and runs from t = 1 to infinity. Uncertainty is modeled by a date-event tree with a time-invariant finite state space S. For each t ≥ 1, we denote the state realized in period t as s t . This is called the period t state, where the (conceptually defined) period 0 state s 0 ∈ S is treated as given. To be more precise, the date-event tree, denoted by Γ, is defined as follows. (i) The root of the tree is s 0 ; (ii) the set of nodes at date t is denoted by Σ t (where we set Σ 1 := {s 0 } × S and Σ t := Σ t−1 × S for t ≥ 2); and (iii) Σ := ∪ t≥1 Σ t and Γ := {s 0 } ∪ Σ. 12 In each period, we assume that the state is realized at the beginning of the period. We denote the set of all probability measures on S as ∆ S . There is a single perishable commodity, called the consumption good in each period. No storage technology nor production technology is available.
In each period, one new agent enters the economy after the state is realized and lives for two periods. In the rest of this paper, we concentrate on the stationary situation. Therefore, agents are distinguished by the state in which they are born, and not the time nor the past history of the realized states. An agent born in state s t and period t is endowed with ω y st units of the consumption good in the first period of their life, and ω o s t+1 in state s t+1 in the second period. We assume that (ω y s ,
Note that the secondperiod endowment is assumed to be independent of the shock in the first period. Therefore, the economy is represented by a point (ω y s , ω o s ′ ) s,s ′ ∈S in the positive orthant of the finite-dimensional Euclidean space, ℜ S×S ++ , given the agent's preferences described below.
Preferences
We denote the contingent consumption stream of an agent born in state s t at date t as
Each agent born in state s t at date t is assumed to rank the consumption streams c st according to their lifetime utility function U st : ℜ + × ℜ S + → ℜ. Furthermore, each agent born in state s is assumed to form a belief about an occurrence of the next period's state that is represented by a set of priors which are totally subjective, given the state realized in the period when they were born. 13 Throughout this paper, we assume that an agent born in state s has an MEU preference. 14 That is, there exists a strictly monotone increasing and strictly concave real-valued function u on ℜ + × ℜ + , which is continuously differentiable on the interior of its domain, and a compact and convex subset P s of ∆ S ∩ ℜ S ++ such that
Note that we assume that u is common to all agents. When P s is a singleton for each s ∈ S, the preference degenerates into the standard subjective expected utility. In such a case, P s = {π s } 13 That is, the formation of the belief is independent of the past history of realized states. Further, the set of priors may not be common to all agents who are distinguished by the states at which they are born.
14 Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatized the MEU preferences over lottery acts and Casadesus-Masanell, Klibanoff and Ozdenoren (2000) axiomatized the MEU preferences over Savage acts. Their axiomatization does not depend on whether the state space is finite or infinite, and hence, it may be applied to our situation with a finite state space.
for some π s ∈ ∆ S for each s and we may write U s (c s ) as U (π s )(c) since U s does not depend on s directly by the commonality of u. Then, because U (π s )(c s ) is clearly continuous in π s for each c s and because P s is compact by the assumption, the minimum in (1) can be actually achieved.
And hence, U s is well-defined. We often write U s (c s ) as U Ps (c s ) again because U s depends on P s , not directly on s. We define the nonempty set of priors which achieve the minimum in (1) by M as follows:
One can easily verify that this lifetime utility function is strictly concave because of the strict concavity of u. We will use this fact when we characterize the equilibria and when we show their conditional Pareto optimality.
Remark 1 The present model is very close to those of Magill and Quinzii (2003) and Labadie (2004) . 15 However, the interpretations on the agents' beliefs in this paper and in previous works are different. For example, Magill and Quinzii (2003) require that the (unique) subjective probability measure should coincide with the true probability measure that follows from a Markov process. On the other hand, in the present model, subjective beliefs does not necessarily coincide with the true or objective probability measures even when such measures exist. In other words, the formation of the agent's belief which is represented by a set of priors, whether it is a singleton or not, is totally subjective and it could be totally irrelevant to the true or objective probability measures. This interpretation on the agents' beliefs might be considered as a kind of bounded rationality and is different from those of Magill and Quinzii (2003) and Labadie (2004) .
We sometimes write P = (P s ) s∈S and call it the transition probability correspondence. Here, we give an example of the transition probability correspondence.
Example 1 Suppose that there exist someπ : S → ∆ S and ε : S → [0, 1] such that, for each
Obviously, this is an example of transition probability correspondences. Then, the associated 15 Labadie (2004) considered a time-separable utility index function. 16 The ε-contamination was first axiomatized by Nishimura and Ozaki (2006) . lifetime utility function (1) takes the form:
Note that an increase in ε s increases the ambiguity in the sense that P s dilates. The effect of this type of increase in ambiguity will be studied in Section 7.
Stationary Monetary Equilibrium
We next turn to the definition of a stationary monetary equilibrium, a stationary equilibrium wherein money circulates. To describe the intergenerational trade via money, we introduce an infinitely-lived outside asset that yields no dividends and is in constant supply. We denote the stock of fiat money as M > 0, which is constant over the date-events. We also let p s be the real price of the money and q s be the real money balance at state s ∈ S. By definition, p s M = q s and therefore p s and q s has a one-to-one correspondence. A stationary monetary equilibrium is then defined by a pair (q * , c * ) of a contingent real money balance q * ∈ ℜ S ++ and a contingent
Condition (i) requires that the pair of the consumption stream (c * y s , (c * o ss ′ ) s ′ ∈S ) and money holding m * s must be the solution of the (lifetime) utility-maximizing problem of the agent born in state s. Condition (ii) is the market-clearing condition of fiat money. 17 We can easily verify that, in any stationary monetary equilibrium, the market-clearing conditions for the contingent commodities hold (the Walras' law). That is, for each s,
This also implies that the second-period consumptions at a stationary monetary equilibrium are independent of the state realized in the first-period of an agent's life; i.e., c * o
17 In (i), we assume that the budget constraints hold with equalities. We can do this for the first budget constraint without loss of generality by the strict increase of u. For the other budget constraints, we simply assume it. Also note that we exclude corner solutions by assuming that (c y ,
This type of stationary monetary equilibrium plays an important role in the following analyses.
Finally, note that, after an equilibrium real money balance q * has been chosen (and the money market has cleared), the equilibrium consumption stream c * is automatically and uniquely determined from the budget constraints. Therefore, we can identify a stationary monetary equilibrium (q * , c * ) with an equilibrium positive real money balance q * . By using this convenient property, the agents' optimization problems can be simplified to the ones of choosing an optimal money holding. For later references, we define the utility function V s of the money holding m s for each agent born at state s facing the real money balance q * ∈ ℜ S ++ . Formally, for each s ∈ S,
where c ms
. Note that V s is concave because of the strict concavity of u. We often suppress the superscript q * when it is obvious from the context.
Two-state Illustrative Examples
Before conducting formal analyses, this section offers two examples which provide intuitions for the mechanism which generates indeterminacy of equilibria.
The next example assumes only two states and constructs economies which exhibit indeterminacy of equilibria. In particular, it shows that the indeterminacy is caused by the nondifferentiability of the MEU preferences at consumption streams which are fully-insured with respect to the second-period consumptions.
Example 2 Suppose that S = {α, β}. Additionally, specify the model by assuming that
Because we consider a two-state model, the optimization 
between two commodities contingent upon state α and β. This means that we can consider solutions of the MEU-maximizing problem and stationary monetary equilibrium using a "box diagram" with indifference curves derived fromÛ s and the budget line. In Figure 1 , the boxes depict the space X α ∩ X β and indifference curves, derived fromÛ s , through (x α , x β ) = (1, 1) and (x α , x β ) = (2, 2). The U -shaped and ⊂-shaped curves are related to indifference curves for agents born at states α and β, respectively. Note thatÛ s (1, 1) <Û s (2, 2). It is assumed that ε = δ = 0.5 in Figure 1 corresponds to the initial endowment, and straight lines through it represent the "budget lines".
A second-period consumption (x o α , x o β ) at a stationary monetary equilibrium then corresponds to a point on a "budget line" when it is tangential to the indifference curves of both agents (α and β). When ε = δ (i.e., there exists no ambiguity), we can find a unique stationary monetary equilibrium, as in Figure 2(a) . Here, the dashed line depicts the set of points at which the indifference curves of agents α and β are tangential to each other. 20
When ε < δ (i.e., there exists ambiguity), there exists a continuum of stationary monetary 19 To be more precise, the marginal rates of substitution for indifferent curves derived fromÛ s , denoted by 20 To be more precise, the uniqueness of stationary monetary equilibrium follows from, for example, Proposition 1 of Magill and Quinzii (2003) or Theorem 1 of Ohtaki (2013b) . The previous example suggests that the indeterminacy of equilibria arises because of nonsmoothness of the agents' MEU preferences and how to characterize such equilibria is not yet clear. The next example also assumes only two states and gives an intuition for the characterization of the stationary monetary equilibria under ambiguity. 
We have observed in Example 2 that there exists at least one economy generating such an equilibrium.
Then, we can show that V s is not differentiable at M , which must be chosen at any stationary monetary equilibrium. This is easy to verify. First, we can obtain
and, for any real number h that is sufficiently close to but not equal to 0,
Then, it follows that
which gives us a partial characterization of the stationary monetary equilibrium.
Robust Indeterminacy
This section presents the first two out of four achievements we mentioned in the Introduction and constitutes the main body of this paper. Subsection 5.1 characterizes the stationary monetary equilibria by the solutions to the system of difference inclusions. Subsection 5.2 shows that there exists a continuum of equilibria and that it is robust in the sense that there exists an open set of economies all elements of which generate such indeterminacy of equilibria.
Characterization of Stationary Monetary Equilibria
The inequalities in (3) in Example 3 can be interpreted as a requirement that, in a stationary monetary equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between the first-and second-period consumptions lies in the range of expected rates of the return of the money. We may thus say that (3) represents a trade-off existing between intertemporal consumption smoothing and aversion to ambiguity and that agents can avoid ambiguity in the second-period consumption by sacrificing smoothing between the first-and second-period consumptions. Furthermore, the range of the marginal rates of substitution which are admitted at a solution of the agents' optimization problems is nondegenerate by the presence of ambiguity. All of these suggest that, under the MEU preference, a stationary monetary equilibrium may be characterized by the solution to the system of difference inclusions, not of difference equations.
The conjecture made in the previous paragraph is in fact correct as we show below. It is well-known that if a stationary monetary equilibrium exists, it can be characterized by the solution to the system of difference equations that are derived from the first-order conditions of the agents' optimization problems provided the agents' preferences are represented by standard smooth utility functions. 22 In contrast, the stationary monetary equilibria in our model with the MEU preference, if they exist, can be characterized by the solutions to the system of difference inclusions.
Theorem 1 A positive vector q * ∈ ℜ S ++ is a stationary monetary equilibrium if and only if
where u i is the derivative of u with respect to the i-th argument.
This is a natural extension of the characterization of a stationary monetary equilibrium in a stochastic OLG model with a single prior. In fact, if P s is a singleton for all s ∈ S, this system of inclusions degenerates into a system of equations. Then this result turns out to be the same as the one of a stochastic OLG model with a single prior, as shown in, for example, Definition 2 of Magill and Quinzii (2003) .
To close this subsection, we provide the characterization of fully-insured stationary monetary equilibria, which is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 A positive vector q
is a fully-insured stationary monetary equilibrium if and only if
where c * y s = ω y s − q * s .
The inequalities in (5) are obviously natural extensions of the inequalities in (3). Therefore, this result can also be interpreted as a trade-off between intertemporal consumption smoothing and aversion to ambiguity. We will exploit this corollary to find economies that certainly generate a continuum of stationary monetary equilibria. to show that the indeterminacy may arise even when there exists the aggregate uncertainty. In fact, each element of the set of economies whose existence is to be proved exhibits the aggregate uncertainty (see Remark 3 below).
Existence and Robust Indeterminacy of Equilibria
In the previous subsection, we observed that the stationary monetary equilibria can be characterized by the solutions to the system of difference inclusions. However, we have not yet shown the existence of such solutions. Consider an equilibrium real money balance q * ∈ ℜ S ++ , such that for any
In this case, there exists a neighborhood of q * in which M s (c M s (q)) is "constant and a singleton" for each s. 26 We refer 23 To be more precise, Magill and Quinzii (2003, Proposition 2) show the indeterminacy of the candidates for "expectation functions," each of which constructs a nonstationary rational expectations equilibrium with circulating money.
24 See also Theorem of Ohtaki (2013b) . 25 As shown by Gottardi (1996) , a "zero-th order" stationary monetary equilibrium (where money prices only depend on the current states) is locally isolated. In contrast, Spear, Srivastava, and Woodford (1990) showed that the "first-" and "second-order" stationary monetary equilibria (where money prices may depend on the past states) are indeterminate. In our paper, the stationarity always refers to the "zero-th order."
26 The basic idea is as follows. Let s1 := arg min s ′ ∈S ω o s ′ + q * s ′ and let M1 be the set of probability measures to this unique measure (which depends on s because P s depends on s) as µ s . The system of inclusions, (4), is then a system of simultaneous equations:
Any solution to this system is an equilibrium of the economy. Its local nature (including the existence of a continuum of solutions) is the same as the standard stochastic OLG model and is well-known. There is nothing new here and so we have not pursued this line any further. 27
Next, we consider a partially-insured equilibrium in the following sense. Let S ′ be a subset of S with |S ′ | ≥ 2. Consider an equilibrium real money balance q * ∈ ℜ S ++ such that, for any
) includes all the probability measures in P s that assign the same probability to S ′ . However, because q * need not be constant over S ′ (although ω o +q * must be), the set in (4) is not necessarily a singleton. Therefore, a continuum of solutions to the system of inclusions (4) may arise. To spell out the configuration of endowments that allow such indeterminacy could be very difficult. However, we may choose a continuum of q * 's appropriately so as to keep ω o + q * constant over some set but to make its (constant) value vary as q * varies. This "endogenized flatness" can be further exploited to show the indeterminacy of fully-insured equilibria.
Recall that a pair of first-and second-period endowments, (ω y , ω o ) ∈ ℜ S ++ ×ℜ S ++ , is called an economy. We say that an economy exhibits equilibrium indeterminacy if the stationary monetary equilibrium for it exists and is indeterminate. Furthermore, define the function f :
for each (c y , c o ) ∈ ℜ 2 ++ , which is the marginal rate of substitution between the first-and secondperiod consumptions. Note that f is continuous because u is continuously differentiable. We can now demonstrate the robust indeterminacy of stationary monetary equilibria.
in Ps that assign the largest probability to s1. Then, let s2 := arg min s ′ ∈S\{s 1 } ω o s ′ + q * s ′ and let M2 be the set of probability measures in M1 that assign the largest probability to s2. Continuing this process can lead to a single probability measure in Ps that is the unique element of Ms(c M s (q)). In general, however, the success of this procedure hinges upon the nature of Ps. In this sense, the argument of this footnote stands only heuristically. For example, if Ps is characterized by ε-contamination, the above procedure will determine a single probability measure. For the ε-contamination, see Nishimura and Ozaki (2006) and references therein. 27 As stated in the previous footnote, the system of equations can possibly be a system of inclusions. Because we are concerned with a sufficient condition for multiple equilibria, we can neglect such a situation for our purpose. , and f ( · , c o ) is surjective for each c o > 0.
Therefore , Remark 2 Gottardi (1996) showed that in a more general stochastic OLG model with many agents that have convex preferences and with many securities, a stationary monetary equilibrium generically exists (Theorem 1.i). We can deduce from this result that a stationary monetary equilibrium generically exists in our model with a convex MEU preference. Additionally, Gottardi showed that the equilibrium is locally isolated when the agents' preferences are smooth (Theorem 1.ii). To be more precise, he showed that any open set of economies has its open subset of full Lebesgue measure under convex and smooth preferences and that each element of that subset generates a locally isolated stationary monetary equilibrium. 28 His observations still hold in our model provided that the agent's belief about the uncertain situation is summarized by a single probability measure. In contrast with his result, however, Theorem 2 shows the existence of some open set of economies that exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy under the MEU preference, which is convex but not smooth. Therefore, Theorem 2 is in stark contrast to previous results under smooth preferences.
We can provide an important property about economies that generate fully-insured stationary monetary equilibria. As argued in the following remark, such economies exhibit aggregate uncertainty.
Remark 3
Let ω := (ω y , ω o ) ∈ ℜ S ++ × ℜ S ++ be an arbitrary economy generating indetermi-nacy of fully-insured stationary monetary equilibria. Letc * o be a second-period consumption corresponding to some fully-insured stationary monetary equilibrium given the economy. We can observe that this economy exhibits aggregate uncertainty. To be more precise, it holds that 
However, we can find that there is no 
However, this is a contradiction.
additive separability of u, Magill and Quinzii (2003, Proposition 1) provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of stationary monetary equilibrium. Following their result, if there is a stationary monetary equilibrium under a unique prior, it can be unique when the degree of relative risk aversion of the utility function for the second-period consumption is less than or equal to one. 30 However, it follows from Corollary 2 that there exists a continuum of stationary monetary equilibria under the MEU preference even when the degree of relative risk aversion of the second-period utility function is less than or equal to one. Therefore, Corollary 2 is a stark contrast to previous results under the smooth and additively time-separable preferences. 31
In this subsection, we have found the robust indeterminacy of stationary monetary equilibria.
This indeterminacy is proved via the "endogenized flatness"; i.e., the fact that we can choose equilibrium real money balances so that the second-period consumptions can be constant over all states.
In the following two sections, we provide further results on the fully-insured stationary monetary equilibria.
Comparative Statics
This section shows that an increase in ambiguity implies both an increase in the "degree" of indeterminacy and the dilation of the set of economies that exhibit a continuum of fully-insured stationary monetary equilibria. Given an economy ω = (ω y , ω o ) and a transition probability correspondence P, we define the set of second-period consumptions at fully-insured stationary monetary equilibria byĈ o P (ω). That is, we let Note thatĈ o P (ω) may be empty for some ω. Additionally, defineΩ P bŷ
30 This result can be extended to slightly more general preferences. See Ohtaki (2013b) . 31 In the framework of additively time-separable preferences, Manuelli (1990) also provides uniqueness results under an additional assumption that the states' evolution follows an i.i.d. process. He considers a stochastic OLG model with a general state space, and hence, it includes a finite state space case as in our model as a special case. Note that even when the set of priors, Ps, is independent of s, Corollary 2 still demonstrates the existence of a continuum of stationary monetary equilibria. Note thatΩ P is the set of economies in which a fully-insured stationary monetary equilibrium exists. Finally, we write P ⊂ Q when P s ⊂ Q s for each s ∈ S. In accordance with the notion of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , we may say that Q represents more ambiguity (and more ambiguity aversion given the MEU preference) than P, when P ⊂ Q. We can then prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let P and Q be two transition probability correspondences such that P ⊂ Q. Also assume that u and P satisfy all the assumptions of Theorem 2 (and hence,Ω P is nonempty by
Recall thatΩ P andĈ o P (ω) are the set of economies that exhibit indeterminacy (of the fullyinsured equilibrium) and the set of second-period consumptions for some fully-insured equilibrium. As mentioned above, the theorem indicates that an increase in uncertainty increases the degree of indeterminacy of the fully-insured stationary monetary equilibrium and, at the same time, expands the set of economies that exhibit a continuum of fully-insured equilibria.
Remark 5
The above observation is made by the comparative statics with respect to ambiguity.
Following Ghirardate and Marinacci (2002) , we define "greater ambiguity" as dilation of the set of priors. As argued in Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) , such a definition of greater ambiguity cannot disentangle an attitude toward ambiguity from ambiguity itself. 32 In other words, our definition of greater ambiguity involves the effects of both increasing ambiguity and increasing ambiguity aversion. Theorem 3 then states that such a greater ambiguity increases the sizes of both the set of stationary monetary equilibria and the set of economies that exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that conducts comparative statics with respect to ambiguity in a stochastic OLG model with money.
Optimality
We have shown the existence of a continuum of stationary monetary equilibria. A question that naturally arises is whether the allocations corresponding to these stationary monetary equilibria are optimal or not. The answer is that they are, in some sense. We begin with some definitions.
where c o s 0 s is the consumption of the initial old , who lives for one period in period 1 and in state 
with at least one strict inequality. The latter set of inequalities means that the initial old will not be worse off when moving from c to b, where we implicitly assume that the initial old will never be satiated. A stationary feasible allocation c is conditionally Pareto optimal if there is no other stationary feasible allocation that is conditionally Pareto superior to c.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 Every stationary monetary equilibrium achieves conditional Pareto optimality.
Theorem 4 claims that even when there exists a continuum of stationary monetary equilibrium allocations because of the MEU preferences, each element of the continuum is conditionally Pareto optimal. 33 In other words, all equilibria found in Theorem 2 are incompatible with each other in the sense of the Pareto superiority.
Remark 6 When the agents' preferences are smooth, the conditionally Pareto optimal allocations are characterized by the dominant root of the matrix of marginal rates of substitution being less than or equal to one (Aiyagari and Peled, 1991; Chattopadhyay and Gottardi, 1999; 33 Note that the proof of Theorem 4 does not require continuous differentiability of u. Chattopadhyay, 2001; Ohtaki, 2013a, among others) . However, as we have already seen it, the MEU preferences are nonsmooth. Therefore, we cannot directly apply the characterization results developed by the studies mentioned above to the current model. Instead of applying the established characterization results, we can more directly demonstrate the optimality of the stationary monetary equilibria by tailoring Sakai's (1988) proof to our model. Sakai demonstrates the conditional Pareto optimality of the stationary monetary equilibrium allocations in a stochastic OLG model with the standard expected utility preferences while his proof does not hinge upon this specific form of preferences.
Lemmas and Proofs
We first prove that each stationary monetary equilibrium given an economy is characterized by a system of inclusions. To handle this case, we apply the following lemma that was directly adapted from Aubin (1979, p.118, Proposition 6) . Let x ∈ ℜ. Suppose that (a) Π is compact; (b) there exists a neighborhood X of x such that functions π → f π (y) are continuous (in the metric topology) for all y ∈ X; and (c) for all π ∈ Π, f π is concave and differentiable. Then, g is differentiable at x both from the left and the right and it holds that
Df π (x).
We can apply this lemma to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Because U Ps (·) is strictly concave, a real number m ∈ ℜ is a solution of the degenerate optimization problem in (2) if and only if
where D − V s (m) and D + V s (m) are the left and right derivatives of V s (m) taken with respect to m (the existence of which is given by Lemma 1). Therefore, we can characterize a stationary equilibrium by a system of inequalities:
for all m ∈ ℜ and M s (c M s (q * )) is convex for all s ∈ S, we obtain (4).
We need the following lemma to prove Theorem 2.
Lemma 2 Suppose that there are two distinct probability measures µ, ν ∈ ∆ S , such that µ, ν ∈
Proof of Lemma 4. Because µ and ν are distinct probability measures on S, there exists at 
Here, the first and the last inequalities hold because P s ⊂ Q s , and the second and third inequalities hold because of the assumption that d ∈Ĉ o P (ω). Therefore, d ∈Ĉ o Q (ω), and hence, Proof of Theorem 4. Sakai (1988) proved that if U s : ℜ ++ × ℜ S ++ → ℜ is increasing and strictly quasi-concave for all s ∈ S, then, for any stationary feasible allocation c corresponding to a stationary monetary equilibrium, there exists no other stationary feasible allocation b that is conditionally Pareto superior to c. (Sakai (1988) assumed that U s is represented by an expected utility function with a utility index that satisfies some regularity conditions. However, his proof only requires that U s should be increasing and strictly quasi-concave.) Clearly, U s is increasing.
Furthermore, because U s (·) is strictly concave, it is strictly quasi-concave. 34 Therefore, the proof is complete. 
